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Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
MICHAEL KAGAN, REBECCA GILL & FATMA MAROUF*
Nonprecedent decisions are the norm in federal appellate courts and are seen
by judges as a practical necessity given the size of their dockets. Yet this system
has always been plagued by doubts. If only some decisions are designated to be
precedents, questions arise about whether courts might be acting arbitrarily in
other cases. Such doubts have been overcome in part because nominally
unpublished decisions are available through standard legal research databases.
This creates the appearance of transparency, mitigating concerns that courts
may be acting arbitrarily. But what if this appearance is an illusion? This
Article reports empirical data drawn from a study of immigration appeals
showing that many-and in afew circuits, most-decisions by the federal courts
of appeals are in fact unavailable and essentially invisible to the public. This
Article reviews the reasons why nonpublication is a practical, constitutional,
and philosophical challenge for judges. It argues that the existence of
widespread invisible adjudication calls for a rethinking of the way courts
operate, the way practitioners advise clients, and the way scholars study the
legal system.
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INTRODUCTION
Whenever a lawyer searches for federal appellate cases, Westlaw and Lexis
offer two kinds of results: reported decisions and unreported decisions. These
labels are strange. If a case was "unreported" or "unpublished," it would not
appear on a search engine and might emerge into the public eye only through a
leak. We know that unreported and unpublished are antiquated terms for
nonprecedent. But this implicit understanding points to a deeper question.
Although the appellate opinion is the centerpiece of American law and the
primary text for American legal education, it "is now the exception rather than
the rule."' Nearly 90% of decisions in federal courts of appeals are now
designated "unpublished." The rates vary considerably by circuit, however, with
the most extreme circuit publishing less than 4%.2 Does the existence of
unpublished or nonprecedent decision making threaten basic assumptions about
how our courts operate?
In fact, from roughly 2000 to 2006, the propriety of nonprecedent decisions
generated a fierce debate. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held,
briefly, that its own practice of issuing nonprecedent decisions was unconstitu-
tional. The objection was simple: When a court says that a decision is not a
precedent, the court seems to be saying that the court might be acting outside
the law, or at least in some manner that it would not want to be bound to repeat.
Many scholars intervened in the debate, often expanding on the constitutional
objections. Two other circuits took on the issue, handing down strong opinions
defending the practice of nonprecedent decisions, thereby producing a circuit
1. Norman R. Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The Federal Courts and the Power of
Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 761, 762 (2004).
2. See U.S. CouRr ADMIN., TABLE B-12-U.S. CouRrs OF APPEALS JUDICIAL BUSINESS (2016), http://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data tables/jbb12_0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/XY82-J7HU] (not-
ing the Fourth Circuit reported an unpublished rate of 96.3% between September 30, 2015 and 2016).
The Fourth Circuit has apparently had the lowest publication rate for some time. See Anika C. Stucky,
Building Law, Not Libraries: The Value of Unpublished Opinions and Their Effects on Precedent, 59
OKLA. L. REv. 403, 404 (2006) (noting the Fourth Circuit's publication rate is the lowest of federal
courts of appeals at 8.2%, and the First Circuit's is the highest at 42.8%).
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split. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that lawyers could be
sanctioned for mentioning unpublished decisions in their briefs. A Supreme
Court showdown seemed likely. Congressional hearings were held.
The controversy was diffused, if not resolved, by revisions to the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure in 2006. Since the new rules went into effect in
2007, lawyers (in federal court, at least) have been allowed to talk about
unreported decisions. But this change did not clarify what, if any, weight should
be given to these decisions. It did, however, seem to instill a kind of transpar-
ency that enabled courts to continue a practice they have found indispensable as
they cope with burgeoning dockets. Some judges have pointed out that unpub-
lished opinions are available as a safeguard against arbitrary behavior by courts.
Although it remains unclear why some appellate decisions are precedents while
others are not (or at least are of less precedential value), that we can see both
kinds when we do basic research offers some comfort that courts are less likely
to act arbitrarily because they are acting in the open.
But what if this transparency is a myth? That some unpublished decisions
appear on search results creates an illusion that all such decisions are available.
Our research indicates that there are, in fact, many high stakes cases decided on
the merits that are invisible through standard legal research in at least one high
stakes area of federal appellate litigation: deportation proceedings.
For several years, we have been conducting empirical research on immigra-
tion adjudication in the federal courts of appeals.3 These appeals are typically
the last judicial recourse for immigrants subject to orders of removal by the
Board of Immigration Appeals, part of the Executive Office for Immigration
Review within the Department of Justice. Because we were initially interested
in preliminary procedural questions that arise in these cases and in how differ-
ent circuit courts manage their caseloads, we did not use Westlaw or Lexis.
Instead, we mined data from PACER, the federal courts' electronic docket
management system. PACER is a system set up for practitioners to file docu-
ments with the court, but not for research purposes. It includes the full universe
of immigration petitions filed with the courts of appeals, many of which are
rapidly dismissed on purely procedural grounds, for instance if the petitioner
failed to pay a filing fee or failed to submit a brief. We never expected these
cases to be in Westlaw or Lexis.
However, we were surprised to find that many cases that PACER showed had
been decided on substantive grounds did not appear when we looked for them in
Westlaw or Lexis. As we report in this Article, Westlaw includes almost none of
them. Lexis is better, but it still is missing large numbers of these cases,
including nearly half of the decisions in the Ninth Circuit, which is the largest
3. See generally Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan & Rebecca Gill, Justice on the Fly: The Danger of
Errant Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (2014); Michael Kagan, Fatma Marouf & Rebecca Gill,
Buying Time? False Assumptions About Abusive Appeals, 63 CATH. U. L. REv. 679 (2014).
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circuit and has the most immigration cases. However, at least for the immigra-
tion cases in our sample, PACER does not allow us to read the decision in many
instances because the document is locked in the database, accessible only to the
parties to that individual matter. What this means is that we can see that the case
exists and that it was decided, but we often cannot see the content of the
decision because many such documents are locked. Moreover, even for un-
locked decisions, a litigant searching for a similar fact pattern or legal question
would not be able to find them, because PACER does not have a text-based
search feature.
Our data indicate that there is a wide body of invisible immigration decision
making occurring in the circuit courts, producing decisions that are truly
unpublished, not merely designated as nonprecedents. Although caution is
required before generalizing across all areas of federal litigation, the widespread
phenomenon of unsearchable, truly unavailable decisions in immigration cases
raises significant jurisprudential concerns even if it is somewhat unique. Immi-
gration appeals now take up an extremely large portion of federal courts of
appeals' dockets. 4 They have inherently high stakes, and they concern one of
the most controversial subjects in our legal and political system.
In this Article, we report our findings and identify questions posed by
widespread invisible adjudication in the federal appellate courts. We trace the
practical origins and evolution of unpublished or nonprecedent decision mak-
ing. We explore the early philosophical debates about the nature of the common
law that laid the groundwork both for our current system of selective precedent,
and the objections to it. We review the circuit split that emerged about whether
this system is constitutional.
Our primary purpose is to highlight a problem and identify questions that
require consideration by the legal community. The invisibility of a great deal of
federal appellate litigation on a subject of considerable public interest should
reignite the debate about unpublished decisions. Rather than remain in the state
of ambiguous d6tente that has prevailed since 2006, the courts should provide
clear answers about whether it is proper to consider only some appellate
decisions precedent. Even if selective precedent is acceptable, is it proper to
make only some decisions available to the public? Finally, if selective transpar-
ency is acceptable, who should decide which decisions are published and which
decisions remain invisible?
The existence of a wide body of invisible appellate adjudication should lead
legal scholars to scrutinize their methodologies. More research should be done
to discover the extent of invisible decision making in federal and state courts.
Legal scholars need to be clear about the limitations they are imposing on their
research if they only look at cases available through standard research tools.5 If
4. See Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 3, at 339.
5. See Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Making the
Decision to Publish, 3 J. App. PRAc. & PROC. 325, 330 (2001) (comparing researching law by only
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scholars are interested in the impact of law on society at large, or in the general
behavior of courts, it may make little sense to look only at the selective sample
of decisions that are available on Westlaw or Lexis, much less only at those that
are designated as precedents. Empirical legal researchers have long understood
this, but even in this field, prominent studies have often relied on Westlaw and
Lexis to collect their data.6 This methodology may require reassessment.
Practitioners need to be aware of the existence of invisible adjudication to
give their clients accurate advice. Traditional legal research and analysis may be
sufficient to inform a client about how her case might be decided according to
legal doctrine as established in precedent decisions. But such traditional tech-
niques leave open the possibility that actual judicial behavior might be different
in important ways in most cases, which are not designated as precedents.
Without being able to see a court's decisions in similar cases, a lawyer will be
less able to clearly answer a client who asks: "Am I likely to win?" The
existence of invisible adjudication should inject more doubt into lawyers'
confidence that they really know how courts are going to behave in future cases.
This doubt is not healthy for our legal system, which depends on transparency
and the expectation of consistency.
In Part I, we establish some baseline terminology about unpublished deci-
sions. In Part II, we give an overview of practical, real world challenges that led
to the increasing importance of unpublished decision making. We report the
findings of our empirical research in Part III. In Part IV, we address the
constitutional controversy that the practice of nonprecedent decisions has gener-
ated. Part V roots this controversy in the history of common law jurisprudential
philosophy.
I. TERMINOLOGY: UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS AND INVISIBLE ADJUDICATION
In both judicial and scholarly discussions, the terminology of publication and
precedent are often used synonymously. This can obscure courts' policies and
practices and can confuse efforts to address concerns that have been raised
about them. Although courts sometimes use the term "published" (or "unpub-
lished"), this nomenclature is of limited use to describe the public availability of
judicial decisions, and it obscures important questions about what should be
considered a precedent in an American court.
Despite the meaning conveyed by the labels "unpublished" and "unre-
ported,"'7 some circuits began releasing texts of unpublished decisions to West-
looking at published decisions to a "'drunkard's search'-the drunk looks for money not where it is
dropped, but under the street light").
6. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 405 (2007).
7. "Unpublished" is often used colloquially by lawyers. Westlaw, by contrast, gives a search option
for "reported" or "unreported" cases.
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law and Lexis in the 1980s." In 2001, West Publishing began publishing its
Federal Appendix, so that there is now a semi-official reporter for nonprecedent
but nevertheless visible decisions.9 By 2005, texts containing unpublished
decisions from all federal circuits were available on Westlaw and Lexis.io This
development blurred the line between published and unpublished decisions. 1
But it may also have created a false impression that all federal appellate
decisions are actually publicly available and searchable in standard legal re-
search databases. 12 That has never been the case.
A decade ago, David C. Vladeck and Mitu Gulati observed that there are
three types of decisions in the courts of appeals: merits decisions that are
published, merits decisions that are unpublished, and nonmerits decisions in
which cases are resolved on purely procedural grounds. 13 The last category-
the nonmerits decisions-has long been a "black box" about which little is
revealed, in that the public record of the decision is often limited to a one-line
docket entry. 14
Overall, the federal courts have a system of selective publication and selec-
tive precedent, but precedent and publication are independent of one another.
Only some decisions are published, and only some published decisions are
precedents. We are adopting the adjective "visible" to describe decisions that
are available and searchable on Westlaw and Lexis. In a literal sense, these
decisions are being published electronically and often in bound form. But the
legacy of calling nonprecedent decisions unpublished has obscured this literal
meaning, and thus calls for a new terminology. In this Article, we adopt Vladeck
and Gulati's taxonomy, with additions. There are four relevant categories of
decision, not just three. As they noted, there are published merits decisions, and
there are unpublished merits decisions. However, nominally unpublished merits
cases come in two varieties: those that are available on standard research
databases and those that are not. These merits decisions are much like the
procedural decisions that have long been in a black box.
8. See Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for Ethical
Problems & Legal Malpractice?, 26 Miss. C. L. REv. 185, 205 (2006).
9. See id. at 207.
10. Id. at 206-07.
11. Id. at 207.
12. See, e.g., Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet
& Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 30 (2002) (statement of J. Alex
Kozinski), http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju80454.000/hju80454_O.htm [https://
perma.cc/CQJ4-Y6J2] [hereinafter Kozinski Testimony] ("Today, of course, all dispositive rulings,
whether designated for inclusion in an official reporter or not, are widely available online through
Westlaw and Lexis, as well as in hard copy in West's Federal Appendix."); David R. Cleveland,
Draining the Morass: Ending the Jurisprudentially Unsound Unpublication System, 92 MARQ. L. REv.
685, 688 (2009) ("Though still labeled 'unpublished opinions,' these opinions are published, not only
online but also in printed volumes . . . .").
13. See David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over Unpub-
lished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1667, 1668-69 (2005).
14. Id.
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The taxonomy of appellate decisions that we propose is as follows:
1. Precedent decisions
2. Nonprecedent, visible decisions
3. Nonprecedent, invisible decisions
4. Nonmerits decisions (invisible)
To be clear, in some sense, a document on PACER may be available to the
public and thus arguably could be considered visible. However, PACER is a
different tool than Lexis or Westlaw.1 5 PACER contains a wealth of data, but
much of it is sealed. Even the case information that is theoretically available is
difficult to access. We previously studied the impact of nonmerits decisions on
immigration appeals, focusing on how long it takes different courts to resolve
cases that are decided on the merits versus those that are not. 16 By analyzing
PACER, it is possible to measure the duration of these cases, because the dates
of filing are listed. 17 But it is not possible to check whether a decision to dismiss
a petition is correct by reading a published decision and critiquing its reasoning
on the merits.
Lexis and Westlaw are designed to be research tools for both practitioners
and scholars. By contrast, PACER's primary purpose is as a filing and docket
management system for the courts. It is designed to let parties to litigation file
motions and briefs in their own cases, not to let people research other people's
cases. As a result, PACER's user interface is cumbersome for research pur-
poses."8 Most importantly, there is no document-level search function whereby
one can look for certain legal or factual issues in docketed cases.1 9 In our
research, with some finesse, we were able to use PACER to identify all the
immigration appeals in each circuit court. But it is not possible with PACER to
identify, say, asylum cases involving LGBTQ applicants, or cancellation of
removal cases that involve caring for an older relative. It is thus not an effective
tool to find factually or legally similar cases that may be pertinent as a potential
precedent in a pending case. In this way, judicial decisions that cannot be
searched for by relevant factual or legal criteria might as well be invisible for
practicing lawyers, as well as for judges trying to use past cases to guide their
analysis of a new one. In short, PACER allows us to prove that many otherwise
invisible decisions by courts exist. But PACER is also, inadvertently, an ideal
means of hiding these decisions in plain sight.
15. All three tools have the significant disadvantage of a pay wall, which creates a monetary barrier
to public access to legal information.
16. See generally Kagan, Marouf & Gill, supra note 3.
17. Id. at 695.
18. See Brian Carver, What Is the "PACER Problem"?, FREE LAw PROJECT (Mar. 20, 2015),
https://free.law/2015/03/20/what-is-the-pacer-problem [https://perma.cc/N46Q-W3KJ].
19. Id.
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Lexis and Westlaw are increasingly duplicating data available on PACER.
This means that some of the docket reports that one can find for PACER can
now also be seen on Lexis and Westlaw. This seems to be a service of
convenience for subscribers to these commercial research tools; if they know a
case number or case name, they can look at the docket for the case. But they
cannot see more information than they could on PACER. The full decisions are
not available to view, nor are they searchable. Thus, this improvement in the
commercial research databases does not actually address the visibility problem
that we highlight here.
Our focus on invisible decisions by appellate courts corresponds to an
important recent study of district court decisions by Elizabeth Y. McCuskey.20
She explains that district courts issue lengthy, detailed decisions that "often
contain reasoning in greater length, depth, and intricacy than their visible
counterparts."2 However, she writes, these "[s]ubmerged precedent[s]" are
"reserved solely for those who know [they] exist[]." 22 McCuskey uses the term
precedent more loosely than we do, so as to include any "written decision
supported by reasoned elaboration."2 3 We concur that such decisions could
functionally serve as precedents, if judges want them to. However, as we
explain in Part IV, judges are divided about whether it is appropriate to treat all
reasoned decisions as precedents. This ambiguity is an even greater concern
with appellate courts than with district courts, because refining legal rules and
developing case law to guide future disputes is normally assumed to be a central
function of the appellate judiciary.
Our four-part taxonomy could be subject to further caveats and exceptions.
One of the most controversial exceptions concerns precedent decisions that are
deliberately hidden from the public. For the most part, precedent decisions are
by necessity visible and published. It is hard for a decision to be used as a
precedent by practitioners if it is not available to them, explaining why the term
"published" came to mean precedential. But we have learned recently that there
are secret precedents in the realm of national security cases, produced by a
federal court under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. We discuss this
phenomenon in brief in Part II, but the serious implications and questions that it
raises is not our focus. Rather, the phenomenon of secret precedents highlights
precedent and publication as two independent concepts.
20. See generally Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515 (2016).
21. Id. at 516.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 519.
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II. PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS
A. EVOLUTION OF AN AMBIGUOUS SYSTEM
In the 2015-2016 fiscal year, 88.7% of decisions by the federal courts of
appeals were designated "unpublished." 2 4 The rates vary considerably by cir-
cuit, with the most extreme circuit publishing less than 4%.25 The D.C. Circuit
is more prone to publishing its decisions than any other, yet 61.8% of its
decisions are unpublished.2 6 Only four federal circuits currently publish more
than 20% of their decisions.27
In this section we summarize how this came to be and explain the rules
governing how courts designate only a small number of decisions as precedents.
The main explanation is simple practicality. The courts are busy, and it would
be difficult and expensive to produce fully developed written decisions in every
case. As Judge Alex Kozinski, formerly of the Ninth Circuit, told Congress,
"While an unpublished disposition can often be prepared in only a few hours,
a[] [published] opinion generally takes many days (often weeks, sometimes
months) of drafting, editing, polishing and revising."2 8 It should be noted,
however, that this explanation for nonpublication concedes an uncomfortable
reality in our court system. Namely, judges will not devote the same effort to
every case and will sometimes produce less thorough work.
In fact, publication of legal decisions has a long but inconsistent history.29 In
old English courts, some cases that were considered especially important were
collected in Year Books, but lawyers were also permitted to cite unreported
cases by vouching for the existence of the decision.3 0 In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, some appellate courts may have been able to publish
24. See U.S. CoURT ADMIN., supra note 2. The rate of unpublished decisions by the federal courts of
appeals has been high for some time. See Erica S. Weisgerber, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient
Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. L.J. 621, 622 (2009) (more than three-quarters in 2009);
Williams, supra note 1, at 763 (more than 80% in 2004); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney,
Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L.
REv. 69, 72 (2001) (more than 80% in 2001); see also Beth Zeitlin Shaw, Please Ignore This Case: An
Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Circuit, 12 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1013,
1024-30 (2004) (detailing statistics on the growth of unpublished Federal Circuit decisions).
25. See U.S. CouRr ADMIN., supra note 2 (noting the Fourth Circuit reported an unpublished rate of
96.3%). The Fourth Circuit has apparently had the lowest publication rate for some time. See Stucky,
supra note 2, at 404 (noting the Fourth Circuit's publication rate is the lowest of federal courts of
appeals at 8.2%, and the First Circuit's is the highest at 42.8%).
26. See U.S. COURT ADMIN., supra note 2.
27. Id.
28. Kozinski Testimony, supra note 12, at 32. A former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit also
remarked, "First, you can't publish everything. Everybody seems now finally to realize that. You could
if you wanted to wait six years for your decision, six years." See Shaw, supra note 24, at 1013 (quoting
Seventh Ann. Jud. Conf of the U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Fed. Cir, 128 F.R.D. 409, 420 (1989)
(statement of former C.J. Howard T. Markey)).
29. See generally Lance A. Wade, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process Argument
Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REv. 695, 700-08
(2001).
30. See id. at 701-02.
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all of their merits decisions as bound reporters developed; these reporters now
form the backbone of law libraries. 31 But it is not clear that there was ever a
period when all cases in all appellate courts were published. If there was, it did
not survive past the middle of the twentieth century.
A steady increase in the courts' workload was the engine that fueled the
growth of the modern phenomenon of invisible adjudication, because it led
federal appellate courts to increasingly rely on selective publication and selec-
tive precedent to manage their dockets.3 2 In 1964, the Judicial Conference of
the United States recommended that only opinions that had "general preceden-
tial value" should be published.33 In the 1970s, the Judicial Conference of the
United States called for the circuit courts of appeals to develop "opinion
publication plans."34
As Norman R. Williams wrote, "[t]he published written opinion-the hall-
mark of American appellate justice-is now the exception rather than the
rule."3 5 Williams aptly observed that the existence of unpublished decisions
creates a system of superior and inferior decisions, in addition to the well-
known hierarchy of courts.36 Obvious puzzles result from this, such as discern-
ing what makes for a more persuasive precedent: an unpublished decision by an
appellate court or a published decision by a district court? What about the
relative weight of an unpublished decision within the same circuit versus a
published decision by another circuit? The answers to these questions are not
clear. However, court rules governing unpublished cases deal with three related
but nevertheless separate questions.37 First, should courts be allowed in the first
place to select only some of their decisions for publication (or to be considered
precedents)? 38 Second, should litigants be allowed to cite nonprecedent (unpub-
lished) cases in their arguments, when such decisions are, in fact, available? 3 9
Third, can an unpublished case, if it is known to the parties and to the court, be
considered a precedent of any kind?4 0 To these three questions, we would add a
fourth: Is it proper for courts to issue decisions that are not made available to
the public at all, absent a compelling reason why the cases need to remain
confidential?
For a time, the lower courts' approaches to these questions generated a
brewing crisis. The trend in the early 2000s was for courts to ban parties from
31. See Cleveland, supra note 12, at 696.
32. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does the
Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM.
U. L. REv. 757, 760-63 (1995).
33. Id. at 761.
34. Williams, supra note 1, at 770.
35. Id. at 762.
36. See id. at 774.
37. See id. at 768-69.
38. See id. at 768.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 768-69.
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citing nominally unpublished cases, even though many such decisions were
increasingly available on standard legal research databases. 4 1 If parties are not
allowed to cite a decision, courts need not wrestle with the question of whether
that decision has any relevance in a new case. But this, of course, requires
litigants and judges to treat factually similar decisions by the same court as a
kind of elephant in the room-something that is probably quite pertinent, but
that cannot be discussed. Competent lawyers, judges, and judicial clerks work-
ing on a pending case would know that an otherwise analogous case had already
been decided, but they would not be allowed to talk about it. They would also
have some difficulty discerning whether the prior decision is predictive of a
future one.
By 2004, the nonpublication system was the subject of serious controversy,
resulting in congressional hearings and at least a brief circuit split. The Eighth
Circuit decided, initially, that refusing to consider an unpublished decision as a
precedent would violate the Vesting Clause in Article III of the Constitution,
under which "[t]he judicial Power of the United States[] shall be vested" in the
Supreme Court and the inferior federal courts established by Congress.4 2 An
Eighth Circuit panel reasoned that the power to decide the law inherently carries
precedential authority.43 In other words, the court could not constitutionally
issue nonprecedent decisions. However, one year later, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit found that precedent was not meant to be a rigid concept in the
Constitution." The Eighth Circuit later vacated its decision, as we will discuss
in more detail in Part IV.4 5
This controversy was diffused by the issuance of a new rule. In 2006, the
Supreme Court amended the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under the
new Rule 32.1, which applies to cases beginning in 2007, "A court may not
prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or
other written dispositions that have been[] designated as 'unpublished,' 'not for
publication,' 'non-precedent,' 'not precedent,' or the like."4
The new rule does not clarify if unpublished opinions have precedential value
or if it is even proper for courts to designate certain opinions as nonprec-
edents.4 9 It is now permissible to tell courts about unpublished cases, but it is
not clear if courts must follow them as precedents or give their analysis or
holding any weight. Ambiguities like this introduce a significant degree of
41. See id. at 764-65.
42. Id. at 781; see also U.S. CONST. art. III.
43. Williams, supra note 1, at 781.
44. Id. at 785-86.
45. See Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
46. See Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals,
74 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 23 (2005).
47. Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705, 725 (2006).
48. See id. at 725 & n.98.
49. See id. at 706.
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unpredictability. Litigants have little guidance about how a judge will regard a
previous decision that is visible but that was not designated as a precedent by
the court. Attorneys are left to guess or rely on anecdotal experience with
individual judges to decide how much to stress nonprecedent decisions in their
briefs. And attorneys (as well as scholars) are forced to rely on incomplete data
about past decisions to predict how the courts might behave in future cases.
Another problem with the current system is that decisions are inconsistently
available through standard research tools. 5 0 This means that litigants may have
unequal access to potent legal authority.5 1 Consider that in an administrative
law setting, the Department of Justice could theoretically have access to every
case through its internal systems because it serves as the government's law firm
in all of them. Private parties would not have this access and thus could be
disadvantaged if unpublished decisions start to have more influence in litiga-
tion. Nevertheless, this new system has survived despite its unresolved
ambiguities.
B. SELECTING PRECEDENTS
Although the categorization is ambiguous, a hierarchy remains between
published and unpublished cases, which means it is important to know how
courts decide which cases to designate as "published" or as precedents. For
example, the rule in the Ninth Circuit-the largest federal appellate circuit-
establishes three categories of decisions: an Opinion (which is a "written,
reasoned disposition" intended for publication), a Memorandum (which is
similar, but "not intended for publication"), and an Order (which is "any other
disposition").52
The circuit's rules state that a decision should be published as an Opinion if it
meets one of seven alternative criteria:
1. Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of federal law, or
2. Calls attention to a rule of law that appears to have been generally
overlooked, or
3. Criticizes existing law, or
4. Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or substantial public
importance, or
5. Is a disposition of a case in which there is a published opinion by a lower
court or administrative agency, unless the panel determines that publication
is unnecessary for clarifying the panel's disposition of the case, or
50. See generally Solomon, supra note 8, at 203-16.
51. See id. at 203, 207.
52. 9TH CIR. R. 36.1.
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6. Is a disposition of a case following a reversal or remand by the United
States Supreme Court, or
7. Is accompanied by a separate concurring or dissenting expression, and the
author of such separate expression requests publication of the disposition
53
of the Court and the separate expression.
Other circuits use somewhat different formulations, but with a similar thrust.
For example, the D.C. Circuit's rule does not include the Ninth Circuit's
"establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule," but instead includes "a case of
first impression." 5 4 Other circuits have decided to not try to define exactly when
a decision should be published or designated as a precedent. For example, the
Eleventh Circuit's policy provides, "Opinions that the panel believes to have no
precedential value are not published."5 5 The First Circuit has a similar rule, but
also prescribes that for any decision "with a dissent, or with more than one
opinion, the opinion or opinions shall be published unless all the participating
judges decide against publication."5 6 This procedural rule seems based on the
assumption that any case with a split decision is likely to involve a more
difficult issue.
In the circuits with more detailed rules, some of the criteria are straightfor-
ward and can be applied mechanically, but the most important raise weighty
philosophical problems, as we will explore more in Part V. Chief among these is
determining when a case raises a novel issue of law and distinguishing cases
that merely apply an established rule versus those that may in fact modify the
rule. Even in circuits that do not attempt to prescribe when a decision should be
published, these philosophical questions would seem equally relevant.
Beyond the criteria for publication that courts include in their rules, some
empirical studies suggest that other factors have an impact. The personality of
judges appears to make a difference, so that certain judges are more likely to
publish than others. Empirical research on why this may be is limited, though
suggestive. For instance, a study of labor law cases found that the gender of
judges did not seem to correlate with publication rates, meaning men and
women seem equally inclined to seek to have their opinions published.5 " But
that study found that judicial panels including "more graduates of elite law
schools were significantly more likely to publish their opinions, after control-
ling for other factors." 5 9 Some studies have questioned whether nonpublication
53. 9TH CIR. R. 36.2.
54. D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2)(A).
55. 11th CIR. R. 36, I.O.P. 6.
56. 1st CI.R. 36(b)(2)(C).
57. See Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals:
Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 312-13 (1990); see also Merritt & Brudney,
supra note 24, at 95-97.
58. Merritt & Brudney, supra note 24, at 97.
59. Id. at 95-97.
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is more likely if the court rules for one type of party rather than another, but the
evidence is mixed.6 0 In immigration cases, at least those involving an asylum
application, judges appear more likely to publish their decisions when they rule
in favor of granting asylum. 6 ' But in labor law cases involving the National
Labor Relations Board, publication did not correlate with the court being more
likely to rule for the employer or for the union.62
III. OUR FINDINGS: INVISIBLE ADJUDICATION IN IMMIGRATION CASES
There are eleven circuit courts of appeals that regularly decide immigration
cases. 6 3 In a previous study, we developed a database of 1646 immigration
cases filed between April 2009 and 2012 from each of these circuits.6 4 These
cases were drawn from the PACER docketing system and thus are unfiltered by
the court or by research database. 5 The sample therefore includes the full
gamut of immigration appeals to the circuit courts-known as petitions for
review. Many of these cases end on purely procedural grounds, such as failure
to pay a fee or failure to file a brief.6 6 Others end voluntarily, when the
petitioner asks to withdraw the case, or the petitioner and the Department of
Justice mutually agree to a remand. 7 In these circumstances, there is no
judicially issued opinion on the case. Thus, for purposes of the present analysis,
we focused on a narrower subset of cases that the courts ultimately decided,
either on the merits or on jurisdictional grounds. 8 With these limitations, we
had a sample of cases from each of the circuits, as listed in Figure 1.
This sampling allows us to clearly see differences between the circuits.
However, it does not directly allow us to report a national average because some
circuits hear many more immigration cases than others, and our sample does not
60. See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55, 63-64
(2016) (finding, in a survey of 800 qualified immunity cases, some evidence of strategic use of
publication by judges when they reach certain constitutional results).
61. See David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the
Ninth Circuit, 73 U. Ci. L. REv. 817, 820 (2005).
62. See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 24, at 99 tbl.VIII.
63. The D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit do not normally have jurisdiction of immigration cases.
64. Cases were collected and added to our dataset separately for each circuit. We first collected 100
random cases per circuit. Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 3, at 362. For some circuits, we expanded
the random sample because we were seeking a larger sample size of petitioners who had requested a
stay of removal, which was the subject of our original study. Id. However, both the original and
supplemental samples were randomly selected. For a complete description of the methodology used to
develop the sample, see id. at 362-63. The date range was determined based on the original focus of
that study, which was the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418
(2009). See id. at 362.
65. Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 3, at 362.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. PACER dockets do not always give access to the judgment, but they do indicate generally
whether a denial was based on jurisdictional or procedural grounds.
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Figure 1.
represent them proportionately. 69 We kept denials based on jurisdiction separate
in our analysis, because they might be different from merits decisions in terms
of what it would mean to produce a reasoned decision, and courts or research
databases might treat them differently regarding publication and visibility. This
does not mean we would never expect reasoned decisions in these cases,
though. Depending on the situation, jurisdiction might seem clear-cut and
nearly mechanical, but it can also lead to ambiguous legal questions in certain
situations.
We next examined whether Westlaw and Lexis databases include a listing of
the merits cases from our PACER-derived dataset. In other words, we examined
whether a researcher relying solely on these research tools could discover that
the case exists, regardless of whether she could access a decision to read. The
answer was yes, albeit with a significant caveat.
The caveat is that Figure 2 only indicates that the docket was listed. A docket
can be listed, however, without the actual decision being accessible. For most
circuits, Westlaw and Lexis have a feature that includes the same docket records
that are available on PACER. As our data show, this was not the case for the
Second Circuit. But it means that for the other ten circuits, a researcher could
theoretically find the case-but only if the researcher knew how to look for it.
We confirmed that the case was listed by entering the docket number, which
we already knew from having found the case in PACER. However, much
like PACER, this feature is not useful for normal legal research, because it
69. The Ninth Circuit hears the most-as much as 47% of all immigration appeals. See Kagan,
Marouf & Gill, supra note 3, at 690 n.60 (citing U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT 58 (2011), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/judicial council/publications/AnnualReport2011.pdf
[https://perma.ccl2FMU-SUFH]). The Second Circuit received the second most. Id. at 705. The method
we used to collect our sample prevents us from producing a national average. See supra note 64.
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th
Percent Docket Available in Databases:
N Westlaw Lexis
Figure 2.
does not allow a text-based search for cases dealing with particular facts or
legal issues.
Our primary interest was in whether the actual judicial decision is available
to a researcher. We entered each case in our database into Westlaw and Lexis
using the unique docket number to find out. The results are depicted here in
Figures 3 and 4:
The first and most obvious observation to make about this data is that Lexis has
made significant strides toward including otherwise unpublished decisions. Westlaw,
by contrast, includes almost none. It is not clear that a user of Westlaw would know
this, however, which presents a problem to which we return in the conclusion.
85 86
787
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th llth
Percent Merits Decision Available in Databases:
WestIaw Lexis
Figure 3.
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Figure 4.
Even looking solely at Lexis, there are many immigration appeals that are
decided on the merits but that are still unavailable to the public, to practicing
lawyers, and to researchers. The Ninth Circuit alone regularly receives nearly
3,000 immigration appeals per year .7o Thus, if even one third were not included-
and that appears to be the case-there are hundreds of decisions that are
essentially invisible. More specifically, these decisions are unsearchable.
Before going further, we should acknowledge that what is true for immigra-
tion cases might not be true for all cases. Certain aspects of immigration
adjudication might make invisible adjudication more common than in other
federal litigation. One reason to suspect this may be the case is the sheer
number of cases. Another reason why immigration appeals may be different is
procedural. Removal cases are administrative; they start in Immigration Court
and are first appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), both of
737%
which sit within the Department of Justice." Only after a final order of removal
is issued by the BIA may a petition for review be filed to a circuit court of
72~
appeals.7 This means that, for the federal judiciary, immigration cases skip the
usual first instance courts-the district courts. In theory, this need not change
the role of the court of appeals. The court of appeals will review findings of fact
by administrative tribunals by a deferential standard. But it is still possible
that some courts of appeals may have relatively less confidence in the system of
70. See Kagan, Marouf & Gill, supra note 3, at 690 n.60 (citing U.S. CouRrS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,
supra note 69).
71. See generally 8 C.F.R. 1003.1 (2017) (setting out the composition and functions of the Board
of Immigration Appeals).
72. 8 U.S.C. §1252 (2012).
73. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1 (1992) (using
the substantial evidence standard in federal court review of factual questions in an asylum case).
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administrative immigration adjudication than they do in federal district courts.
They might therefore feel that they need to resolve basic questions that would
normally not be brought to a federal appellate court, because the appellate court
is the first Article III federal court to consider the case. This is merely a
theoretical possibility; we do not know, and with available data cannot know,
that this is happening.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
As we have seen already in Part II, the reasons why the courts adopted a
system of selective precedent are intensely practical. But this practice carries
significant constitutional concerns. The original states in the United States
endorsed a general right of public access to courts. 4 Invisible adjudication
seems to depart from that tradition. More specific constitutional objections
relate to two different issues, however, although both relate to the question of
transparency. One concerns the possibility that there is a body of invisible law
administered by the federal courts that cannot be readily accessed by the public.
This worry has recently attracted attention in connection with the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court. Because the FISA court issues
precedent decisions, it seems to be creating a body of secret law that challenges
central assumptions of Anglo-American legal philosophy. A different kind of
constitutional concern arises with the more routine practice of courts determin-
ing only a minority of their decisions to be precedent. This raises concern that
the courts, freed from constraining themselves in future cases, might be acting
arbitrarily and might not be acting in a judicial manner as prescribed by the
Constitution. In this context, transparency is a safeguard against arbitrariness.
But if many nonprecedent decisions are invisible to the public, then the constitu-
tional concern may be heightened.
A. COMPARISON TO THE FISA COURT
The existence of widespread invisible adjudication evokes comparisons to
secret adjudication, a concern that has attracted recent concern in relation to the
FISA court. The FISA example illustrates how visibility of a decision and its
status as a precedent are independent questions. However, as we will briefly
explain, the FISA court has raised unique constitutional concerns that we will
not attempt to address.
As in the immigration cases we study, the FISA court involves federal judges
making high stakes decisions on issues of public concern, with the decisions
being inaccessible and hidden from lawyers who do not work for certain federal
74. See Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: "Open Courts," "Terror Trials," and Public Sphere(s),
5 L. & ETHICS Hum. Rrs. 1, 7-12 (2011).
75. See Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (July 6,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadens-powers-of-nsa.html
?mcubz 3 [https://nyti.ms/2k2Kb55].
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agencies. But there are some differences. One is the motivation for invisibility.
FISA decisions are deliberately made secret because they involve national
security. Unpublished immigration decisions are invisible as a matter of conve-
nience, resulting from large appellate dockets clogging the system. They are
invisible, to some extent, as an unintended consequence of the ad hoc way in
which our system of publication has evolved.
Another important difference concerns stare decisis. In immigration cases,
and in normal litigation, a case would remain unpublished, and potentially
invisible, unless it has been designated as a precedent by the court. But the
FISA court issues precedent decisions that are nevertheless secret. 6 This is a
challenge to core assumptions that we usually make about law being published
and transparent so that all can know in advance about the rules that govern
society.77 As we will see in Part V, early philosophers of Anglo-American law,
especially Jeremy Bentham, argued that establishing and protecting public
expectations is a central purpose of law. The concept of "publicity" was
especially central to Bentham's recommendation for making courts and govern-
ment function better. 8 Secret law, by definition, cannot accomplish this. 7 9
From the standpoint of informing the public about rules of law, it would be an
improvement for the FISA court to not allow any of its secret decisions to set
precedent, thus making them more like regular unpublished opinions. This
depends on the assumption that only precedent-setting lawmaking decisions are
of interest to the public-a contestable premise. As others have written, lack of
publication also reduces incentives for judges to write well-reasoned decisions
that can withstand public scrutiny.8 0 Stare decisis is not just a means of making
law and letting the public know what the law is; it is a means of promoting
judicial stability and restraint by holding judges accountable through the expec-
tation of consistency, making arbitrary actions that depart from precedent
visible to all.81
B. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE ABOUT THE NORMAL SYSTEM OF NONPUBLICATION
As we have already seen, the practice of designating only some appellate
decisions to be published precedent developed in response to the practical
realities of burgeoning court dockets. But what is convenient is not necessarily
constitutional. Although courts have continued the practice, they have been
76. See id.; Jack Boeglin & Julius Taranto, Comment, Stare Decisis and Secret Law: On Precedent
and Publication in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2189, 2189 (2015).
77. See Boeglin & Taranto, supra note 76, at 2189 ("[A]n overlooked yet fundamental problem with
the FISA courts' work is that judge-made law can be generated only through stare decisis, a doctrine
that we argue is not justified when applied to secret opinions of the type the FISA courts produce."
(footnotes omitted)).
78. See Resnik, supra note 74, at 4-5.
79. See Boeglin & Taranto, supra note 76, at 2196 (arguing that law should be standardized and
knowable, echoing arguments made by Bentham).
80. See id. at 2194.
81. Id. at 2196.
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unable to entirely shed the constitutional doubt that hangs over it. That many
nonprecedent decisions are invisible using standard research tools is likely to
increase these doubts.
The most visible spark for the constitutional critique of nonprecedent was the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Anastasoff v. United States. 82 In 2000, Faye Anasta-
soff brought a tax dispute with the IRS to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit.83 The primary legal question was about the mailbox rule.84 Ms. Anasta-
soff mailed a refund claim two days before the deadline; it arrived at the IRS
one day after the deadline. 5 The question presented was whether she was late
under applicable statutory provisions. 6 Ms. Anastasoff argued that the mailbox
rule should apply, which would mean she could get her refund."7 This was an
unresolved question for the Eighth Circuit if one looked only at its designated
precedent decisions. But in reality, this was not the first time the Eighth Circuit
court had confronted this precise question about the mailbox rule in tax law.
Eight years earlier, another taxpayer made a similar claim in Christie v. United
States and lost.8 " But Christie was a per curiam decision that had been desig-
nated unpublished, which under the court's rules at the time meant that it could
not be used as a precedent.8 9 Naturally, Ms. Anastasoff wanted to make sure
that Christie remained a nonprecedent. 90 The IRS, by contrast, urged the court
to follow Christie as a precedent. Thus, a case about a tedious procedural
question in tax law turned into a battle over how modern American appellate
courts work.
The Eighth Circuit ruled for the IRS and issued a bombshell decision:
Although it is our only case directly in point, Ms. Anastasoff contends that we
are not bound by Christie because it is an unpublished decision and thus not a
precedent under 8th Circuit Rule 28A(i). We disagree. We hold that the
portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that unpublished opinions are not prec-
edent is unconstitutional under Article III, because it purports to confer on the
federal courts a power that goes beyond the "judicial." 9 1
To support this decision, Judge Richard Arnold conducted a lengthy analysis of
the history of judicial precedent at the time of the framing.92 The crux of his
argument focused on two key premises. First, "inherent in every judicial
82. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000).
83. Id. at 899.
84. See id. The mailbox rule states that a person has met an IRS filing deadline so long as the
document has been placed in the mail on a certain date. See 26 U.S.C. § 7502 (2012).
85. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 900-04.
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decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general principle or rule of
law." 93 The second premise was that there could be no room for making one-off
decisions.9 4 Quoting Blackstone's Commentaries, Judge Arnold wrote that rules
of law had to be "permanent" because "a judge is 'sworn to determine, not
according to his own judgments, but according to the known laws. [Judges are]
not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old."' 95
To designate a decision nonprecedent "would allow us to avoid the precedential
effect of our prior decisions."96 Because a decision that sets no precedent could
not be considered a decision of law, it went beyond the "judicial" power
established by Article III of the Constitution.97
Anastasoff was a shock, and much was written about it. 98 It threatened a
fundamental feature of modern court administration and might have radically
changed how the federal appellate courts work. But it was also effectively a
decision against the court's own interests, in the sense that the court invalidates
its own rule and appears to make its own work harder. Courts have an inherent
conflict of interest when considering whether their own rules are constitutional.
That is especially so when the rule that is challenged seems integral to the way
judges want to organize their work. To tell a judicial panel that every decision
must be a precedent may be the functional equivalent of telling judges, "You
need to work much, much harder." This made the Anastasoff decision even
more remarkable.
The revolution did not last long, however. Not surprisingly, given the magni-
tude of the holding, Anastasoff sought a rehearing by an en banc panel. 99
Perhaps sensing that more was at stake than the mailbox rule, the IRS decided
to simply pay Ms. Anastasoff her refund and asked the court to vacate the
decision as moot.loo The en banc court agreed.o As a result, there is no binding
decision from a federal court of appeals holding that our system of unpub-
lished decisions is unconstitutional. And yet, Judge Arnold's analysis was not reversed
on the merits. 10 2 Perhaps fittingly, it now stands itself as an ambiguous legal precedent.
93. Id. at 899.
94. See id. at 901.
95. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69).
96. Id. at 900.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Michael B.W. Sinclair, Anastasoff Versus Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of
Denying Precedential Authority to Circuit Court Decisions, 64 U. PiT. L. REv. 695 (2003); Douglas E.
Cressler & Paula F. Cardoza, A New Era Dawns in Appellate Procedure, 34 IND. L. REV. 741 (2001);
William J. Miller, Chipping Away at the Dam: Anastasoff v. United States and the Future of
Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals and Beyond, 50 DRAKE L. REv. 181
(2001); Steven A. Fredley, Note, Anastasoff v. United States: Nonprecedential Precedent, Judicial
Power and Due Process: A Case for Maintaining the Status Quo, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 127 (2001).
99. Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
100. See id.
101. Id. at 1056.
102. In 2003, a different Eighth Circuit judge referred to it in a dissenting opinion, indicating that
the constitutional argument still had merit. See United States v. Yirkovsky, 338 F.3d 936, 945 n.3 (8th
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From 2004 to 2006, Congress held hearings on unpublished decision rules
and the Supreme Court ultimately revised the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and Anastasoff became the springboard for law review articles
arguing against unpublished opinions. 10 3 The articles expanded the constitu-
tional objections. Not only was the notion of a nonprecedent decision a viola-
tion of the vesting clause in Article III, it also might violate procedural due
process. 10 4 Yet, despite the enthusiasm of some scholars, two circuits had
already directly rejected Judge Arnold's decision in Anastasoff. The most
prominent was a lengthy opinion by the Ninth Circuit's Judge Kozinski in Hart
v. Massanari in 2001.05 Judge Kozinski became a leading proponent of unpub-
lished decisions, later giving testimony to Congress that we have quoted from in
this Article.106 If Anastasoff represented one extreme side of this debate, Hart
represents the opposite extreme. The Ninth Circuit did not just affirm a refusal
to consider unpublished cases as precedents; it held that an attorney could be
sanctioned for having cited a case that was easily accessible on Westlaw and
Lexis. 107
Judge Kozinski offered several rebuttals to Judge Arnold.os Of interest here
is the connection Judge Kozinski saw between systems of publication and
precedent. He argued that precedent at the time of the framing was actually a
more flexible concept than it is today.1 09 The lynchpin of this argument is that,
until at least the nineteenth century, English judges declared the law but could
not make the law.110 Echoing Blackstone, Judge Kozinski argued a single
decision should not be rigidly binding because a single judge in a single case
could be wrong.' In Judge Kozinski's view, at the framing of the Constitution,
individual cases were less important than the combined force of many examples
of past practice-but judges still retained the authority to discard examples with
Cir. 2003) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (expressing doubt about whether the circuit's unpublished decision
rule was constitutional).
103. See, e.g., Weisgerber, supra note 24; Wade, supra note 29; Dragich, supra note 32.
104. See generally Wade, supra note 29. Moreover, the pre-2006 rules that prohibited litigants from
even citing unpublished decisions might violate the First Amendment.
105. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
106. See Kozinski Testimony, supra note 12; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
107. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159 n.2 (noting that the Ninth Circuit rule went farther than the Eighth
Circuit rule because the Ninth Circuit prohibited citation); Id. at 1180 (declining to impose sanctions,
although they would be constitutional, because the Anastasoff decision had produced doubt about the
rule).
108. As a matter of constitutional law, he questioned whether the vesting of judicial power in federal
courts in Article III was a limitation on judicial power. Id. at 1161. This attacked an essential premise of
Anastasoff, but it is beyond the scope of this Article.
109. See id. at 1163; see also Sinclair, supra note 98, at 703 ("[T]he constitutionality and wisdom of
no-citation rules depend on one's conception of stare decisis. Its operation and grounds are not the same
now as in the founding period . . . ").
110. See Hart, 266 F.3d at 1165.
111. Id.
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which they disagreed.1 12 As Judge Kozinski and his Ninth Circuit colleagues
saw it, our modern system of rigid precedent forces courts to be more careful
about what they consider to be a precedent. He wrote, "Designating an opinion
as binding circuit authority is a weighty decision that cannot be taken lightly,
because its effects are not easily reversed." 1 3
What is interesting in Judge Kozinski's analysis is that he seems to not rely
on the criteria that are stressed in his own court's rules, which we have quoted
above in Part II. He does not focus on whether the merits of the case raise
unique issues or have the potential to change or clarify the law. Instead, he
focuses on the amount of effort judges can devote to the decision, because he is
first and foremost concerned that the judges might make a mistake. Judge
Kozinski seems to be arguing that, because the cases are hard, a precedent
should only be set when a court is able to consider an issue with the care that it
deserves.1 1 4 The first panel to consider an issue might not get it right, even
though the first case decided on a question of law would be likely to establish a
new rule of law. By analogy, Judge Kozinski argues that circuit courts' distinc-
tion between precedent and nonprecedent decisions serves a similar purpose to
the Supreme Court's practice of only granting cert to a number of cases that is
small enough to allow it to produce fully considered opinions.1 1 5 But, as we
have already noted, Judge Kozinski seems to also be admitting-implicitly, at
least-that judges might not always be able to devote the attention to a case that
is required, and might make significant errors in the process. This is why he
does not want all his court's decisions to be available for use as precedents.
In 2002, the Federal Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit's lead in Symbol
Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, a patent case raising the question of
whether the equitable doctrine of prosecution laches could bar patent enforce-
ment.1 1 6 The Federal Circuit had previously rejected the laches doctrine in two
unpublished patent cases.' 1 7 Like Judge Kozinski, the Federal Circuit argued
that, at the time of the framing, the system of common law precedent did not
require every case to be reported." They noted that Sir Francis Bacon had
advised King James I to omit from case reports decisions that were "merely
iteration and repetition." 1 9 But as in the Ninth Circuit decision, this reasoning
112. Id. ("Common law judges looked to earlier cases only as examples of policy or practice, and a
single case was generally not binding authority. Eighteenth-century judges did not feel bound to follow
most decisions that might lead to inconvenient results, and judges would even blame reporters for cases
they disliked.").
113. Id. at 1172.
114. See id. at 1177 (noting that courts only have the resources to craft precedent decisions in some
of the cases that come before them).
115. Id.
116. 277 F.3d 1361, 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
117. Id. at 1365.
118. Id. at 1367.
119. Id.
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blurs the distinction between unpublished and nonprecedent decisions. 12 0 More-
over, it is one thing to say that cases that merely reiterate established rules can
be considered nonprecedents. But that does not explain-and the Federal
Circuit made no effort to explain-why it designated as nonprecedent its only
on-point decisions on the laches doctrine in the patent context. These were not
reiterations of a rule. That is why so much depended on whether they could be
treated as precedents.
The constitutional doubts have never entirely receded. In 2015, Justice
Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) expressed concern that lower courts had
designated some decisions as unpublished when they should have been pub-
lished. 121 A recent study of 800 qualified immunity cases in the federal courts
by Aaron L. Nielson and Christopher J. Walker adds empirical weight to Justice
Thomas's concern. 12 2 The gist of this concern is that allowing judges to
designate their decisions as nonprecedents invites judicial mischief.
The two circuit decisions rejecting Anastasoff were published before the revision of
the rules allowing citation to nominally unpublished decisions. This adds to the
lingering ambiguity. In the Ninth Circuit's Hart decision, the holding was that a
lawyer could be sanctioned for doing something that is now explicitly allowed. Judge
Arnold's critique of nonprecedent decision making still pops up periodically, espe-
cially when litigants find that the nonprecedent status of a past decision hurts their
cause. For example, in 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit avoided ruling
directly on an Anastasoff-like challenge to a state court's nonprecedent rule by
dismissing a suit on standing grounds. 12 3
In 2016, Judge Costa on the Fifth Circuit appeared to endorse Anastasoff in a
dissent. 1 24 The case at hand concerned whether a Georgia "aggravated assault"
conviction was for a "crime of violence" as defined in federal immigration and
sentencing law, a legal question that has generated a great deal of litigation in
recent years. A series of unpublished decisions by the court had found that
Georgia's "aggravated assault" was, indeed, a crime of violence. 1 25 The two-
judge majority of the court found that these cases were not precedential but
".may be considered persuasive."1 2 6 It then proceeded to offer several pages of
120. Id. at 1368 (referring to "unpublished, or ... nonprecedential decisions").
121. Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) ("True enough, the decision below is unpub-
lished and therefore lacks precedential force in the Fourth Circuit. But that in itself is yet another
disturbing aspect of the Fourth Circuit's decision, and yet another reason to grant review. The Court of
Appeals had full briefing and argument on Austin's claim of judicial vindictiveness. It analyzed the
claim in a 39-page opinion written over a dissent. By any standard-and certainly by the Fourth
Circuit's own-this decision should have been published." (internal citations omitted)).
122. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 60, at 63 (finding empirical evidence of strategic behavior by
judges to not publish certain kinds of constitutional decisions, possibly to take advantage of the
composition of judicial panels in particular cases).
123. See Smith v. Mullarkey, 484 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007).
124. See United States v. Torres-Jaime, 821 F.3d 577, 586 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2016) (Costa, J.,
dissenting).
125. Id. at 582 (listing unpublished decisions).
126. Id.
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detailed textual analysis of the unpublished cases, much as a court would have
done in deciding whether to apply a rule from a precedential, published
decision. 127 This extensive examination of cases that nominally were not bind-
ing precedents formed a backdrop for Judge Costa's dissent, which explained,
"The strong interest in uniform application of the law means that we should
usually follow unpublished decisions. But the difference between published and
unpublished decisions must mean something. Otherwise, we should just 'pub-
lish' everything and give all opinions the weight of binding authority."1 28
The point of this, it would seem, is that giving judges discretion to decide
whether nonprecedent decisions should nevertheless guide future cases intro-
duces a new source of apparent arbitrariness to the process. We might take this
one step further by noting that judges have two opportunities to exercise
arbitrary discretion-first in deciding whether to designate a decision as a
precedent, and second in deciding whether to follow a supposedly nonprecedent
decision despite its designation.
Judge Costa made an additional point that distinguished the case at hand from
Anastasoff. In response to Judge Arnold's contention that nonprecedent decision
making invites inconsistent decision making, Judge Costa took a different
approach:
This case does not require fleshing out the full contours of when the desire for
consistency that should ordinarily lead us to follow unpublished decisions
should give way to the interest in getting the law right. For it involves a
situation in which a departure from nonprecedential authority should not be
controversial: when a key legal premise of those unpublished decisions is
revealed to be demonstrably false. That is the case here with respect to our
prior, unpublished rulings which incorrectly assumed that the Georgia assault
statute requires intentionally causing apprehension of violent injury. 129
Judge Costa's revisiting of the Anastasoff debates is interesting in that it
comes after the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure revisions. Unlike the
Ninth Circuit and Federal Circuit panels, he considered unpublished opinions at
a time when it was clear that litigants may cite them. The majority opinion from
which he dissented illustrates the ambiguities of this new era. Unpublished
decisions can no longer be ignored. Lawyers can no longer be sanctioned for
talking about them, which means that judges may be tempted to analyze them in
considerable depth. What, then, is the point of calling them unpublished or of
designating them nonprecedents?
In response to these questions, Judge Costa argued that judges should just try
to get the law right instead of following precedent rigidly. Rather than argue
over whether a past decision can be considered a precedent, judges should
127. See id. at 582-85.
128. Id. at 586 (Costa, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Costa, J., dissenting).
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instead ask if the past cases were correctly decided. When judges want to cite
extensively to a past decision, it is probably because they find its analysis
compelling, and that really should be the point.
An illustration of this approach may be seen in a series of decisions in the
Ninth Circuit concerning civil rights claims by homeless people who filed an
Eighth Amendment challenge to a local criminal law banning sitting or sleeping
on the street. 13 0 In a 2006 decision, Jones v. City of Los Angeles, the court found
that homeless people had standing to sue and that their constitutional rights had
been violated. 1 31 The court designated its decision as a precedent, and it was
published in the official reporter. 132 However, the parties later settled the matter
and jointly asked the court to withdraw its opinion, which it did. 13 3 This left the
original decision in a state analogous to visible but nonprecedent decisions. The
Ninth Circuit has noted, but not resolved, the lingering ambiguity about whether
Jones should be considered in future cases.134
Despite the ambiguity of Jones's precedential standing, in 2009, a district
court in the Ninth Circuit considering another civil rights suit by homeless
people faced the dilemma of deciding whether to consider the original Jones
decision. 13 5 The district court concluded that, because it had been vacated,
"though the Jones opinion is informative, it is not binding." 1 36 The court then
analyzed Jones at length, concluding that it was "highly persuasive" on the
question of standing1 3 7 but "tenuous at best" on the substantive Eighth Amend-
ment question. 138 It is entirely possible that had the district court considered
Jones to be binding, it would have reached a different holding. That the court
did not consider Jones binding, however, did not stop it from considering the
case at length, and it arguably allowed for a better ultimate result.
As we will see in Part V, this approach is in line with what Blackstone argued
should be the role of the judge. Precedent is evidence of the law, not the law
itself. There are certain decisions that remain technically valid as precedents,
but which are widely understood not to represent law. 13 9 The Korematsu
decision is a prominent example of this anticanon, in that it has not been
overruled but its holding is widely regarded as a tragic error by the Court. 140
But although another writer might see this a good reason not to insist on
130. We are grateful to Prof. Anne Traum for bringing these decisions to our attention.
131. 444 F.3d 1118, 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006).
132. See id. at 1138.
133. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 505 F.3d 1006, 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
134. See Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2013).
135. See Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1225-31 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
136. Id. at 1225.
137. Id. at 1226.
138. Id. at 1231.
139. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REv. 379, 386-87 (2011) (defining the
anticanon as "the set of legal materials so wrongly decided that their errors ... we would not willingly
let die"); Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY BWL
Rrs. J. 327, 329 (2009) (defining an anticanonical text).
140. Greene, supra note 139, at 387.
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publishing every decision, Judge Costa saw it as a reason to minimize the
difference between published and unpublished cases. All past decisions might
inform decision making in a present case, just as any past decision might be
discarded as a precedent if it turns out to have been wrongly decided. But this
would require a weaker adherence to precedent that we often take for granted.
Even assuming the propriety of the present system, it remains unclear how
courts are deciding which of their decisions should be designated precedential.
This is a lingering problem signaled by Anastasoff, Hart, and the more recent
Fifth Circuit case. In each of these cases, litigants confronted a situation in
which the only on-point decisions were designated nonprecedents. The deci-
sions addressed unresolved questions and had value in guiding future adjudica-
tions. They were not mere reiterations of a well-established rule. So why, then,
were they not designated as precedents in the first place? It may be that judges
sometimes test out their reasoning on novel issues through unpublished deci-
sions, intending to later issue a precedent decision after their reasoning has been
applied in several cases or fact patterns. Although this may be a perfectly valid
judicial approach, it does not appear that courts are reliably using the kind of
criteria explicated by federal circuit courts of appeals, recounted in Part II
above. 14 1 As we will see in Part V, this question touches on longstanding
debates in legal philosophy, especially whether "hard" and "easy" cases can
meaningfully be separated.
In this ambiguous constitutional context, the existence of invisible adjudica-
tion may be quite destabilizing. The core critique of nonprecedent is that courts
will be tempted to behave arbitrarily. Because not every decision sets a prec-
edent for the future, it is easier, in theory, for courts to make one-off decisions.
But transparency may mitigate against this risk. 142 Although decisions may not
be binding, if judges become nakedly inconsistent in their decision making,
they can be publicly critiqued. Because nonprecedent decisions can now be
cited, litigants can warn judges in advance that an adverse decision will appear
to be arbitrary. Transparency may conceivably restrain judges from straying too
far and may mitigate constitutional doubts enough to allow the system to
continue. But if it turns out-as our data suggest-that this transparency is a
myth, and if we add to this suspicion that judges sometimes choose to publish or
not publish a decision for improper reasons, then the danger of judicial arbitrari-
ness seems considerably more acute.
V. PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS
The rationales that judges have used to justify our prevailing system of
selective precedent depends on the premise that many or most cases in the
appellate court are simple. They would offer no new understanding of the law,
141. See supra Section II.B.
142. Cf Kozinski Testimony, supra note 12 (arguing that there is no sign of court deviance from
established rules and that decisions are available to the public).
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and to designate them as precedents would force judges to write them more
carefully but would not really improve the legal system. The constitutional
objections to this system are rooted in a belief that by ignoring so many
decisions, something important is lost, either for the public (in the form of
information about the law), or for the courts themselves. To understand these
philosophical underpinnings, we must explore eighteenth century disagreements
between William Blackstone and Jeremy Bentham, which informed twentieth
century debates between legal positivists and realists. To bring these philosophi-
cal questions into more concrete focus, we will use them to contextualize an
analogy to sports. More specifically, Chief Justice John Roberts's famous
assertion that a judge is similar to an umpire calling balls and strikes in baseball.
We will argue that the baseball analogy illustrates why invisible adjudication is
problematic. But first, Bentham and Blackstone.
A. BENTHAM AND BLACKSTONE
The premise that judges can decide cases without setting a precedent for the
future-without disseminating their reasoning and sometimes without even
writing down an explanation for the decision-highlights longstanding prob-
lems within Anglo-American legal theory. The nut of the problem can be traced
to the differences between Bentham and Blackstone's legal thinking. Had
Bentham been more influential in American law, it would be difficult to see a
place for unpublished decisions today. That unpublished decisions are routine
owes a great deal to Blackstone gaining the upper hand in this country. Yet
Bentham's views continue to exert some influence, and they articulate founda-
tional philosophical commitments that feed ongoing ambivalence about invis-
ible adjudication.
Bentham favored codification of law, preferring legislation over the common
law approach. 143 He wrote at a time when statutes were far less prominent in
resolving routine legal disputes than they are today, and so, in a sense, the legal
world has moved in his direction to a significant extent.' On the other side,
Blackstone famously defended the incremental approach of the common law,
which frustrated Bentham's ambitions for more rapid legal reform.145 Not
surprising for a critic of the common law, Bentham distrusted lawyers and
judges, and he wanted to limit the powers of the latter.146 But, for present
purposes, Bentham's most important argument about the role of judges con-
cerned the predictability of the law, regardless of whether the law was judge-
made or codified by a legislature. Stemming from his utilitarian orientation,
Bentham argued that the object of law should be to protect individual expecta-
143. See Dean Alfange, Jr., Jeremy Bentham and the Codification of Law, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 58,
70-71 (1969).
144. See Richard A. Posner, Blackstone and Bentham, 19 J.L. & ECON. 569, 582, 594-95 (1976).
145. See id. at 593-95.
146. See Alfange, supra note 143, at 58, 70-71 (explaining even when legislation proved unclear,
Bentham preferred to refer questions to the legislature rather than rely on judges to interpret).
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tions, which required that law be both cognizable and accessible. 147 His advo-
cacy of publicity throughout government and law was a primary reason for his
skepticism of the common law, because the case method made it difficult for the
public to easily discern settled rules. 14 8 Where judicial interpretation could not
be avoided, Bentham advocated strict adherence to stare decisis as a check on
judges and as a means to protect expectations about what the law is. 14 9 By
contrast, Blackstone was comfortable with judges occasionally making excep-
tions and creating legal fictions to avoid an inequitable outcome that would
result from strict application of existing rules in a particular case. 150
The Blackstone-Bentham disagreement can be understood in part as a disagree-
ment about whether politicians or judges are the greater threat. Blackstone
inherited his faith in judges from Sir Edward Coke, who is often credited with
establishing the concept of precedent that we still use today. Working a few
decades before Blackstone, Coke promoted precedent as a means to restrain the
King from hearing and deciding legal cases on his own. 15 1 Coke believed that
precedent restrained arbitrary action, but that it also required a decision maker
who was well-versed in the accumulated body of common law. 1 52 By this
two-pronged argument, Coke used the concept of precedent both to limit
arbitrary decision making, while also shifting power from the King to the
Judiciary, where expertise in the common law resided. 153 For him, the virtue of
the common law was that it is complicated and thus required experts. Bentham
disliked it for essentially the same reason.
Differences in how much trust various thinkers were willing to place in
lawyers and judges has a great deal to do with how they might think about
nonpublication of judicial decisions. To understand the legitimacy of judges
deciding not to publicize their decision in ostensibly minor cases, it is essential
to understand what role such cases play in formation of the law. Blackstone and
Bentham offered different answers to this question. For Blackstone, common
law judges should be bound to rules, not to precedents. 1 54 Precedent decisions
are the best evidence of the law, but judges may also make mistakes about the
law.1 5 5 This understanding sanctifies the law in a theoretical sense, because the
law is always the correct rule, but judges may get the law wrong. Blackstone
places a premium on the capacity for lawyers and judges to reason, discern the
correct rule, and detect errors. A Blackstonian approach makes adjudication
inherently unpredictable, and this offends Bentham's belief that the public
147. Id. at 65.
148. See Resnik, supra note 74, at 19-24.
149. See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAw TRADITION 192-93 (1989).
150. See Posner, supra note 144, at 583-86.
151. See Stucky, supra note 2, at 413.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. POSTEMA, supra note 149, at 194.
155. Id.
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should have reliable expectations about how courts will behave.1 5 6 Bentham
also knew that courts could get things wrong, but he thought that judges should
follow past precedents without exceptions so that results would at least be
predictable. 157
From this summary, we can already see how the system of distinguishing
published and unpublished cases fits easily with Blackstone's views, but not so
much with Bentham's. Because Blackstone believed that judicial decisions are
merely evidence of the law, it makes sense that judges would be able to say that
certain cases are stronger evidence than others. Moreover, because Blackstone
trusted judges to adjust rules over time and to make exceptions when necessary,
he would seem to have little difficulty with choosing to publicize their reason-
ing only some of the time. Much as we saw in Judge Kozinski's defense of
nonpublication, Blackstone wanted the courts to eventually get things right
more than he wanted them to be consistent.
Bentham's insistence on protecting public expectations would point in a
different direction. A person who wants to know how a court would treat her
problem does not only want to know how the court handles its significant cases.
In fact, in a system where most cases are treated as minor, a potential litigant
would want to know as much as possible about what she can expect in such
minor cases. Chances are that her case will be a minor one as well. The benefits
of reporting these cases so the public knows what the courts are doing are thus
considerable, especially if one does not trust judges to apply rules consistently.
This general argument features prominently in contemporary critiques of unpub-
lished decisions in the federal courts.1 5 8
Although the United States adopted the common law and turned more toward
Blackstone to develop its legal system, ideas that Bentham would have favored
also took root in America. As Judith Resnik explained, there has long been an
assumption that courts, as a default rule, are open. 15 9 However, there is ambigu-
ity about whether this means merely that the court's procedures and hearings are
open to the public, or if it also means facilitating the dissemination of informa-
tion about the court's activities.1 6 0 Decisions of federal appellate courts illus-
trate this ambiguity. Federal appellate cases may be visible to the public in a
literal sense, in that they will be listed on publicly available court dockets. But
their decisions (and reasoning) are often invisible and not available for
dissemination.
156. See id. at 195.
157. Id. at 195-97.
158. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 32, at 760 (arguing selective publication "impede[s] the develop-
ment of a coherent body of decisional law, frustrate[s] lawyers and judges in performing their daily
tasks, and threaten[s] the legitimacy of the federal courts").
159. See Resnik, supra note 74, at 4.
160. Id. at 13-15.
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B. POSITIVISTS AND REALISTS
The differences between Bentham and Blackstone about the role of precedent
foreshadowed a twentieth century debate in legal philosophy about the distinc-
tion between so-called easy and hard cases. This question emerged through a
series of books and articles known as the Hart-Dworkin debate. The positivists,
Hart being the most prominent, insist that it is possible to distinguish "hard"
cases from the broader pool of matters that come before the courts.16' The
practice of choosing to publish only some decisions depends on this premise;
the criteria that courts use to decide whether to make a decision a precedent
closely map the concept of a "hard" case. 16 2 By contrast, Dworkin's disciple,
Andrei Marmor, famously declared that "there are no easy cases." 1 6 3
The terms here are a bit misleading. An "easy" case is one that falls squarely
within the core of a rule and does not require interpretation or refinement of the
rule. 16 4 That does not really mean that the case is easy, in the sense that there
can still be a high risk of error or a substantial degree of public controversy.
Even when a case presents a problem on which a settled rule offers a clear
answer, it may be practically difficult for lawyers and judges to untangle the
factual complexity of the situation. The O.J. Simpson murder trial was a hard
case for the lawyers and the trial court, but it was easy in the sense that it did
not raise new doctrinal questions in criminal law.
The system of publishing only some decisions as precedents makes perfect
sense if we accept the easy/hard distinction. In this view, hard cases refine the
law and tell us something new about it. Easy cases do not. In an easy case, a
court should focus on just getting the decision right. It need not labor to produce
a fully reasoned opinion because the case is not going to set a valuable
precedent. This effort is better spent on a hard case. It also makes sense that
legal scholarship and legal education would focus primarily on the hard cases-
that is, published cases. If the goal is to understand legal rules and doctrine,
these are the cases that can teach us something. So long as we are comfortable
with the positivist premise that easy and hard cases can be separated, the
practice of not publishing all decisions and considering only a minority of
decisions to be precedents may not seem objectionable.
However, the scenario that led to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Anastasoff
adds some weight to the critique that the easy/hard distinction is not workable in
practice. In that case, the Eighth Circuit had previously issued an unpublished
opinion that answered a question about the mailbox rule for which there was
seemingly no other legal authority.165 This suggests that the original, unpub-
161. See Andrei Marmor, No Easy Cases?, 3 CAN. J. L. & JURIS., July 1990, at 61, 62-63 (1990).
162. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 ("A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal
judicial opinions, orders, or other written dispositions that have been ... designated as 'unpublished,'
not for publication,' non-precedential,' 'not precedent,' or the like . . .
163. See Marmor, supra note 161, at 61.
164. See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 97 (2d ed., 2005).
165. See Williams, supra note 1, at 779.
2018] 713
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL
lished decision was a hard case; it involved an unresolved question of law, and
thus it should not have been classified as an unpublished decision in the first
place. It should not be surprising that this factual scenario made a panel of
appellate judges uneasy with the rule that unpublished cases set no precedent
and could not be cited. The mere fact that this question became so decisive in a
tax case suggests that judges are not able to reliably decide which cases should
be published and which should not.
The debate about easy and hard cases closely maps a similar disagreement
between legal realism and formalism. Legal realism was associated with "rule-
skepticism," a viewpoint that rejected the usefulness of legal rules as a means of
predicting the behavior of courts.1 6 6 This skepticism of doctrinal rules leads to a
focus instead on actual judicial decisions, aiming to predict future decisions
instead of attempting to discern legal rules. 16 7 An extreme version of this
"decision theory" or "prediction theory" would be Jerome Frank's statement
that "[a]ll ... decisions are law. The fact that courts render these decisions
makes them law." 1 68 If this is true, we can immediately see that it is essential
for courts to make all of their decisions available to the public; if law is really
just the decisions judges make, we need to see all decisions if we are to
completely understand the law.
A purist version of prediction theory is problematic because it has little or no
room to acknowledge that a judge could be wrong.169 Moreover, it leaves no
place for legal authorities like statutes, regulations, and constitutions, which are
not decisions, but mere statements of rules. 170 For these and other reasons, the
positivist viewpoint has had the upper hand. Brian Leiter has declared the
Hart-Dworkin debate over, with Hart the winner and Dworkin irrelevant.1 7 1
This may be a significant reason why we have accepted that not all judicial
decisions are published; we accept that rules of law matter more than individual
cases. However, even if we agree that the positivists get the better of this
argument, some of the doubts raised by Dworkin and (earlier) Bentham may yet
give us cause for worry.
C. THE BALLS AND STRIKES ANALOGY
It is possible to accept the supremacy of rules and still care about judges'
actual decisions. This means that we can accept that judges get the law wrong,
and we can accept that some decisions are better exemplars of the law than
others, but we might still resist allowing judges to self-select only certain
166. Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism As Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915,
1917-18 (2005).
167. Id. at 1927.
168. Id. at 1930 (alteration in original).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 267, 270 (1997).
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decisions for dissemination. To illustrate why this is, we can look at an analogy
to baseball. Chief Justice John Roberts famously invoked this analogy during
his confirmation hearings. He said, "I will decide every case based on the
record, according to the rule of law, without fear or favor, to the best of my
ability. And I will remember that it's my job to call balls and strikes and not to
pitch or bat." 1 7 2
The problem with this statement, as any baseball fan knows, is that every
umpire has a slightly different strike zone. Moreover, an umpire's ball and strike
calls are unreviewable. 17 3
At first glance, the balls and strikes analogy seems to set up a classic realist
proposition: Perhaps the rule defining the strike zone is irrelevant and only the
umpires and their decisions matter.1 7 4 But that would go too far. A rule about
the batter's height and stance over home plate has paramount influence on what
counts as a strike.1 7 5 This is why most pitches would be called the same way by
almost every umpire almost every time. As Michael Steven Green explained a
decade before Roberts made his balls and strikes allusion, the best way to think
of this problem is to acknowledge that rules matter-and so do the individual
decisions applying the rule.17 6 The rule anchors the individual decisions, which
are made by umpires who are trying to apply the rule in good faith.1 7 7 It is
because of the rule that it is possible and perfectly reasonable to conclude that
an umpire is applying the rule incorrectly.17" No hitter or pitcher, and no
baseball fan, needs to concede that a strike is whatever the umpire says it is. As
Green explained, "The rule sets up a broad standard of reasonableness beyond
which the umpire's rulings will be invalid."1 7 9 Umpires, like judges, can get it
wrong. But that does not mean that individual decisions are irrelevant. This is
why we need to see every decision.
This understanding of balls and strikes in baseball is like recent scholarship
observing the way that legal doctrine anchors and constrains judicial analysis,
even if one assumes that rules are indeterminate and individual judges differ. 8 o
172. Roberts: 'My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat,' CNN.com (Sept. 12,
2005, 4:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/index.html [http://perma.
cc/34HK-48DE].
173. Green, supra note 166, at 1991-92.
174. Id. at 1992.
175. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES 150 (2017) ("The STRIKE ZONE is
that area over home plate the upper limit of which is a horizontal line at the midpoint between the top
of the shoulders and the top of the uniform pants, and the lower level is a line at the hollow beneath the
kneecap. The Strike Zone shall be determined from the batter's stance as the batter is prepared to swing
at a pitched ball.").
176. See Green, supra note 166, 1992-93.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1993.
180. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreword, The Constraint of Legal Doctrine, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1843, 1847-50 (2015) (discussing multiple ways doctrine constrains decisions); see also Leiter, supra
note 171, at 280-81 (arguing judicial decisions are not, in fact, unfettered).
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Extending this logic, pitchers and hitters need to understand both the rule as
stated and the tendencies of the individual umpire, which they will learn
through experience. The game can tolerate reasonable variations between differ-
ent umpires so long as the umpires are consistent and evenhanded with both
teams. But the players need to be able to see all the umpire's individual
decisions about whether each pitch is a ball or strike so that they can make
better predictions, allowing them to decide with greater accuracy whether to
swing at borderline pitches. It would be a problem if the umpire could somehow
tell players only to look at his best decisions because a hitter needs to be able to
predict the umpire's routine decisions just as much. In this way, the existence of
governing rules does not obviate the need to know and analyze each individual
decision.
The positivist position that easy cases can be distinguished from hard ones is
a necessary theoretical foundation for our present judicial system. But it may
neither fully justify nor fully describe what courts are doing, and thus it does not
eliminate our need to see their decisions. First, the theoretical premise that easy
and hard cases are meaningfully different potentially explains why courts
designate only some of their final merits decisions as precedents. But courts
make many preliminary decisions in cases that are nearly always left unexplained.
This was an important theme of our studies on how the federal courts of
appeals resolve requests for stays of removal in immigration cases." Like
requests for preliminary injunctions, such requests require courts to decide
whether a petition is likely to succeed on the merits, which is a highly
substantive legal question-and not an inherently easy one. We found that the
courts are quite inaccurate in their predictions about how cases will be resolved
on the merits. 182 But courts are also divided doctrinally about how to apply the
preliminary injunction standard, in that the few published decisions reveal a
circuit split about what the preliminary injunction standard should actually
mean. 18 3 Circuit courts attempt to address this question by issuing one or two
published decisions on stays of removal, so as to articulate a standard, but then
revert to deciding future stay requests through unreported, often unexplained,
rulings. 18 4
This question would benefit from incremental refinement of the law through
the process Blackstone outlined. But it is not clear that this happens effectively
because it is rare for such preliminary decisions to be published; in fact, it is the
norm for them to be entirely unreported.18 5 It seems likely that there are many
hard decisions about whether to grant a stay of removal at the beginning of an
immigration appeal, but these decisions are normally invisible. It is understand-
able why courts would not want to devote extensive effort to articulating their
181. See generally Marouf, Kagan & Gill, supra note 3.
182. See id. at 382.
183. See id. at 349-56.
184. Id. at 356, 361.
185. See id. at 361.
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rationales in preliminary decision making in routine cases. Although the effi-
ciency gains are clear, the philosophical justification is not. Nothing about the
theory of easy and hard cases suggests that just because a case is preliminary in
a procedural sense it is necessarily easy in a substantive sense.18 6
Second, even if easy and hard cases are theoretically distinct, we still must
trust actual judges to make the distinction accurately. As we have seen, an
important feature of Bentham's thinking was a pervasive distrust of judges.
Judges could conceivably err in two ways. They might intentionally abuse the
system by consciously departing from settled rules of law while shielding their
arbitrary action by making the decision unpublished. There is some empirical
evidence that this occurs in certain contexts. 1 7 Or judges might be inclined to
make certain decisions unpublished because it is simply convenient in the
context of limited resources.
When a case presents a genuinely hard question of law, an overworked judge
might nevertheless decide the case with an unpublished decision simply because
it removes the burden of producing a well-reasoned decision that will hold up as
a precedent for the future. This might also be a means for a divided judicial
panel to resolve a difficult case; as an alternative to publishing a 2-1 decision
with a strong dissenting opinion, a panel could opt to decide a case unanimously
but without designating the decision as a precedent."" Judge Kozinski told
Congress that this is common, stating, "Sometimes, differences can't be ironed
out, precipitating a concurrence or dissent. By contrast, the phrasing (as op-
posed to the result) of an unpublished disposition is given relatively little
scrutiny in other chambers; dissents and concurrences are rare."189 Such compro-
mises are plausible given evidence that judges minimize the use of dissents and
promote collegiality (or at least the appearance of collegiality) on the bench.1 90
Even if we are comfortable with nonprecedent decisions in the abstract, we
might yet want judges to be transparent about these decisions. Judges are
unlikely to ever state publicly that they are using unpublished opinions for
anything other than the reasons listed in court rules. But that may not be enough
to justify complete confidence that deviations from these rules do not happen.
Confidence in the judiciary requires confidence that judges are not actually
deviating from established rules of law in what are supposed to be easy,
clear-cut cases. Yet this transparency is hard to achieve under the current
186. Many important and closely divided Supreme Court cases are technically decided at the
preliminary injunction stage. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Arizona v.
United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
187. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 60, at 56.
188. See Kozinski Testimony, supra note 12, at 34 (arguing that if all cases were citable, judges
would feel greater pressure to dissent).
189. Id. at 32.
190. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES:
A THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 255-303 (2013); see also Lee Epstein, William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 130 (2011).
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system. When courts decide not to publish a decision, they effectively ensure
that the decision is much less likely to be subject to public scrutiny. This is
especially so if the decision is not included in significant legal databases. This
omission, in turn, is especially likely if the court issues no written decision at all
and more so still if the decision is on a preliminary question. The most invisible
decisions may be those for which transparency is most important to the mainte-
nance of confidence in the judiciary.
CONCLUSION
If scholars focus only on proper understanding of rules-and thus only on the
hard, precedent cases-they only study a fraction of what is going on in the
legal system. To legal scholars who work on traditional doctrinal analysis,
courts' designations of published and unpublished decisions act like directional
signals: Study this decision, not that decision. Judges can use these signals
strategically to reach certain ends.1 91 Scholars may not even always be fully
conscious of this choice because it is implemented through research databases.
If scholars want to investigate anything other than formal legal doctrine, this
practice is a problem. For instance, the cultural study of the law focuses on law
as "a social practice."1 92 If one starts with the question "[h]ow do people
experience and interpret law in the context of their daily lives?"1 9 3 then it
matters little whether a case's legal questions are easy or hard.
Our contemporary concerns about selective precedent emerge from deeper
philosophical concerns which suggest that the existence of invisible adjudica-
tion could unsettle an unsteady d6tente in a centuries-old debate. The apparent
availability of unpublished decisions on standard legal research tools helps to
diffuse misgivings about courts' insistence on designating only some decisions
as precedents. Transparency achieved through availability of unpublished deci-
sions could accomplish two things. First, anyone who wants to know how
courts will behave in ostensibly easy cases could see what the courts are doing.
This transparency would address Bentham's interest in encouraging publicity
and meeting public expectations about how the courts will behave. Moreover,
because unpublished decisions can now be cited, a party who can show that she
is disadvantaged by a court's refusal to publish certain decisions could raise the
issue openly to the court. Transparency is thus a critical glue holding together a
judicial practice that might otherwise be harder to defend. But if, as our data
show, there is in fact a great deal of adjudication on the merits that never
appears in Westlaw or Lexis, this transparency would appear to be just a fagade.
191. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 60, at 92-95 (describing the phenomenon of strategic
nonpublication).
192. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAw: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 36
(1999).
193. See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAw: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY
LIFE 33 (1998).
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And if that is the case, doubts about the legitimacy of the system could grow
once again.
A straightforward solution involves the research databases themselves. 194 We
recommend that commercial legal databases endeavor to include the full uni-
verse of decisions in their databases, at least for appellate courts. Our data
indicate Lexis currently includes more otherwise unpublished circuit court
decisions than does Westlaw. This may be a competitive advantage for Lexis,
but it is a problem for legal practice because some firms subscribe to only one
service, and lawyers may be unaware of the comparative limitations of each
product. Moreover, even Lexis is incomplete. When a database includes only
some decisions in a particular category, it is difficult to escape questions of
selection bias, which would taint any implications drawn from research based
on the database.
Another problem concerns transparency in research databases. Outside the
Second Circuit, 195 both Westlaw and Lexis seem to have a complete listing of
appellate dockets, but they include only a fraction of the actual decisions in
these cases. These dockets are essentially unsearchable; they appear only if one
knows where to look for them. Much like the PACER system from which they
come, they seem to be available only to a researcher who already knows the
docket number or party name. But the database should be able at least to tell a
researcher that a certain number of decisions exist but are unavailable. Right
now, Westlaw and Lexis give researchers the misleading option to show nonre-
ported decisions in search results, which can create the false impression that the
database includes all such decisions. It would be more informative for the
database to tell a user that a percentage of decisions-and perhaps what
percentage of decisions-is unavailable and not included in search results.
Unfortunately, we have not seen either Westlaw or Lexis warn users that their
search results may be quite incomplete. Admitting that their products are not
comprehensive may be against their business interests.
Scholars can also address these gaps. One way is through empirical legal
scholarship, which aims to understand judicial behavior quantitatively. This
research consciously and deliberately avoids drawing conclusions from a single
case. Such research can be an important contemporary way to address Ben-
tham's concern about public expectations of the legal system. By empirically
researching the full universe of judicial decisions, we can better predict how the
judiciary is likely to decide cases based on quantifiable factors. But, of course,
such research will only be as good as the databases they analyze. Nonprecedent
decisions are not particularly problematic if they are accessible. But invisible
cases are a serious challenge.
194. For useful suggestions on improving research databases, see McCuskey, supra note 20, at
563-74.
195. We recommend that the Second Circuit work with legal research services to correct this
problem.
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Finally, practitioners need to be aware that they may be unable to access a
vast body of invisible case law. These cases might not tell them much about the
legal rules they need to apply, outside the context of the FISA court. But they
would tell lawyers a great deal about the judges before they appeal. They would
offer a much wider body of data from which to answer a question nearly every
client asks in litigation: How likely am I to win? In the absence of this data,
lawyers cannot really know how closely the judges follow precedent or whether
the cases the court chooses to publish are in some ways atypical. Practitioners
thus need to be more cautious about what they think they know about the
behavior of the courts, and they should push the courts to be more transparent.
For our legal system, the widespread existence of invisible adjudication could
unsettle the fragile compromises that have allowed unpublished decision mak-
ing to continue until now. If the nonpublication system is far less transparent
than it appears, it means we must trust judges even more than previously
thought. This is a concern for two key reasons. First, some legal thinkers are
reluctant to trust judges much to begin with. Second, the argument for distinguish-
ing precedent and nonprecedent cases acknowledges a significant potential for
judicial error. This acknowledgement of the risk of error is key to Blackstone's
approach to precedent. It is also central to both Judge Kozinski's and Judge
Costa's arguments-even though they reach opposite conclusions about the
propriety of nonpublication. If judges are prone to making mistakes, it is even
more important for others to be able to see what judges are doing. 196
It is sometimes possible to ignore these problems. After all, lawyers and
judges are trained to focus only on designated, published, precedential deci-
sions. But we now know that this focus excludes a great deal-88.7% of the
decisions made by the federal circuit courts, to be precise. To ignore so much
case law certainly distorts our picture about what happens in our court system,
as well as the role that the law plays in American life. It would be problematic if
this were merely a sort of willful blindness by lawyers and judges. But our data
show the problem is deeper. Some of these judicial activities are invisible, even
when people try to look for them.
196. Cf Nielson & Walker, supra note 60, at 119 (calling for judges to give reasons for not
publishing opinions).
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